|
TINDERBOX : THE PAST AND FUTURE OF PAKISTAN
BY M J AKBAR |

PUBLISHER:
HARPERCOLLINS PUBLISHERS INDIA
Rs 499
360 pages
BOOK LAUNCHED ON:
Tuesday, 11
January, 2011 at 6.30 p.m.
Hyatt Regency, Bhikaiji Cama Place
Ring Road, New Delhi 110607
Hon'ble Vice
President Hamid Ansari will release the Book
Panelists:
Hon'ble Vice President Hamid Ansari
L K Advani, Chairman, NDA
Pranab Mukherjee, Hon'ble Finance Minister
Najeed Jung, Vice Chancellor, Jamia Millia Islamia
M J Akbar, Author
Najeed Jung read from the Book
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TinderBox: The
Past and Future of Pakistan
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EXCERPTS
FROM TINDERBOX : PAST AND FUTURE OF PAKISTAN
TINDERBOX
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TINDERBOX @ Book Launch -
REVIEWS
TINDERBOX @ Book Launch - REVIEWS:
M J Akbar on his new Book
Tinderbox by Mubasshir Ahmed
(As told to Krutika Behrawala, Bollywood News Service | Photograph by
Mubasshir Ahmed)
A BRILLIANT BOOK ON PAKISTAN BY L K ADVANI
In the past three
decades I have attended numerous book release functions. In my
preamble to the comments I have been making on the book to be launched
I have often remarked that during the nineteen months of the infamous
Emergency (1975-77) which I spent mainly in the Bangalore Central
Jail, and briefly in the Rohtak Jail, the one word that used to bring
great cheer to all the political prisoners behind bars was the word
‘release’. So, since my own release on 18th January, 1977 – arrest was
on 26th June 1975 – whenever I have been approached by an author with
the request to ‘release’ his book, I have rarely disappointed him.
- Read More in the
L K Advani Doc File |
http://blog.lkadvani.in/
AMAZON.COM
About the Book:
Indians and Pakistanis are the same people: Why then have their
nations moved on such different trajectories since freedom in 1947?
The idea of India is stronger than the Indian, and the idea of
Pakistan has proved weaker than the Pakistani. Pakistan was not born
across a breakfast table. It was the culmination of a search for what
might be called Muslim space that began during the decline of the
Mughal Empire, by a north Indian elite driven by fear of the future
and pride in the past. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, master of the endgame,
wanted, in essence, a secular nation with a Muslim majority, just as
India was a secular nation with a Hindu majority. The father of
Pakistan did not realize there was another claimant to the nation he
had delivered, Maulana Maududi, founder of the Jamaat-e-Islami, and
the godfather of Pakistan. In Tinderbox: The Past and Future of
Pakistan, M.J. Akbar embarks on a historical whodunit to trace the
journey of an idea, and the events, people, circumstances and mindset
that divided India. The investigation spans a thousand years, and an
extraordinary cast: visionaries, opportunists, statesmen, tyrants,
plunderers, generals, and an unusual collection of theologians,
beginning with Shah Waliullah who created a theory of distance to
protect Islamic identity from Hindus and Hinduism. Akbar brings an
impressive array of research, perception and analysis to solve this
puzzle, writing the story in a fluent, engaging style that makes a
difficult subject deceptively accessible. There could be no better
guide to the subcontinent s past, and a glimpse into its future.
The bitter end
to a dream
By Soutik
Biswas
Livemint
An engaging and racy history of Pakistan posits a bleak future for it,
full of turmoil and uncertainty
Is Pakistan a fundamentally flawed state? Why did the dream of a
homeland for Indian Muslims sour so quickly? Why has it become one of
the most violent nations in the world? Not because, in the words of
M.J. Akbar, “Hindus were killing Muslims but because Muslims were
killing Muslims”.
In Tinderbox: The Past and Future of Pakistan, Akbar raises these and
similarly knotty questions. There are no easy answers. But history
provides some tantalizing clues, and the journalist-writer delves into
them abundantly in this book. He suggests the commonly held contention
that Pakistan emerged out of a March 1940 resolution at the Muslim
League session in Lahore may not be the whole truth. The reality, he
writes, is more complex. Pakistan is actually a “successor state to
the Mughal Empire”.
Akbar does not deny that Pakistan, birthed by an English-speaking,
Shakespeare-loving, toffish lawyer, emerged out of Muslims’ “fear of
the future and pride in the past”.
But this fear, he writes, “began as a mood of anguish that set in
among the Muslim elite during the long decline of the Mughal Empire in
the 18th century”.
Muslims living in India for five centuries with a “superiority complex
suddenly lurched into the consuming doubt of an inferiority complex
which became self-perpetuating with every challenge that came during
different phases of turbulent colonial rule”, writes Akbar. In doing
so, a key question was ignored: Was Islam so weak that it could not
survive a minority presence?
Leading Sunni theologian Shah Waliullah proposed a theory of distance
and protection of Islamic purity—he feared that Indian Muslims would
lapse into Hindu practices. Islam could survive in India, he argued,
only if Muslims maintained “physical, ideological and emotional
distance” from Hindus.
Akbar reckons that the “mistrust of the Hindus, fundamental to the
theory of distance, became the catechism of Muslim politics when it
sought to find its place in the emerging polity of British rule in the
early 20th century”.
When Muslim notables demanded separate electorates—Muslims could be
elected only by fellow Muslims—even Muhammad Ali Jinnah protested. He
predicted that India’s unity would be jeopardized by such religious
electorates.
The unruly vicissitudes of history ensured that Jinnah himself became
a fervent votary and founder of this cherished homeland. But a
homeland based on the fear of the majority community in undivided
India may have been doomed from its bloody beginnings. To demonstrate
this point, Akbar falls back on his favourite theological-politician
Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, the most frighteningly prescient Cassandra on
the estranged siblings. “An entity conceived in hatred shall last only
as long as the hatreds lasts,” prophesized Azad. “This hatred shall
overwhelm relations between India and Pakistan. In this situation it
will not be possible for India and Pakistan to become friends and live
amicably unless some catastrophic event takes place.” Azad also
believed that Pakistan’s future would be blighted by incompetent
leadership, high foreign debt, internal unrest, regional conflict and
an iniquitous society, dominated by the “neo-rich and industrialists”.
Akbar is a brilliant raconteur of history, and writes on the
extraordinary course of events that led to the division of India and
the creation of Pakistan in his trademark racy, luminous prose. Six
decades after a bloody Partition, Pakistan is teetering on the brink.
It faces a terrorist blowback at home and opprobrium abroad. Radicals
stymie any effort—however feeble—to make it a modern and centrist
state. A tottering economy fails to produce growth or jobs. Feckless
politicians and a powerful army conspire to keep the country in the
doldrums.
Many believe that only Pakistan’s army and its politicians can rescue
the nation. The army, they say, needs to subject itself to civilian
and parliamentary oversight. Governments need to stop running to the
army and involve them in settling political scores. Shuja Nawaz,
writer of Crossed Swords, possibly the most authoritative book on
Pakistan, believes that though the army remains a conservative
institution, it is not yet overrun by radical Islamists. So if
politicians play their part faithfully and the army stops meddling in
the affairs of the state, he writes, Pakistan may “break out of the
vicious cycle that has kept it from developing as a progressive
nation”.
Akbar is not so hopeful. He believes a strain of theocracy runs
through the “DNA of the idea of Pakistan”. Ergo, efforts to convert
the nation into a Taliban-style Islamic emirate “will continue in one
form or the other, at a slow or faster pace”. So will it then
eventually disintegrate, with the fiercely independent Balochis and
Pashtuns exploiting the turmoil and breaking away? Akbar doesn’t think
so, and posits an even bleaker future: Pakistan, he writes, displays
all the characteristics of a “jelly state”, neither stable, nor
imploding. It is a chilling premise. Has Jinnah’s dream turned into a
nightmare without end?
Soutik Biswas is
the India editor of BBC News online.
MSN
MSN News
M J Akbar
''presents'' Pak''s past and future in a tinderbox
Zafri Mudasser
Nofil
New Delhi, Jan 14 (PTI) Pakistan may have little hope for peace with
India but a settlement with New Delhi will help remove the jihad
culture ravaging the country, writes veteran journalist M J Akbar in
his new book.
In "Tinderbox: The Past and Future of Pakistan", published by
HarperCollins India, Akbar embarks on a historical whodunit to trace
the journey of an idea, and the events, people, circumstances and
mindset that divided India.
The investigation spans a thousand years, and an extraordinary cast:
visionaries, opportunists, statesmen, tyrants, plunderers, generals,
and an unusual collection of theologians, beginning with Shah
Waliullah who created a ''theory of distance'' to protect ''Islamic
identity'' from Hindus and Hinduism.
"There might be little hope for peace with India, given the
fundamental divergence on Kashmir, but a settlement with India will
help excise the jihad culture ravaging Pakistan," says Akbar.
According to the writer, it is comparatively easier for India to come
to terms with Pakistan.
"Economic growth and dreams of becoming a part of the first world have
begun to dominate the Indian mind. The Indian middle class has begun
to appreciate a simple reality: social violence and economic growth
cannot coexist. Liberalization has had an impact on lifestyle and
attitudes.
"The culture of consumerism has been quickly adopted by the young,
while entertainment television is a mirror of sexual liberation and
the fusion of Western mores with Indian sentiment."
He says that the
most remarkable aspect of this change was that "even terrorism, often
exported from Pakistan, and wearing an ''Islamic'' label, did not feed
a backlash in the form of Hindu-Muslim riots, even after the venomous
terrorist attacks in Mumbai in 2008."
Akbar feels India is content being a status quo-ist power, determined
to preserve its current geography, without serious claims even on
territory it believes it has lost to China along the Himalayas and to
Pakistan in Kashmir.
"Peace is a logical extension of this position. There is a large and
growing constituency in Pakistan that understands this. But unless
Pakistan achieves clarity on terrorism, with all its snake-oil
justifications, the subcontinent will remain hostage to malevolent
mania," he writes.
The book also talks about LeT''s involvement in the 26/11 attacks.
"LeT''s involvement with the terrorist strike on Mumbai is well known,
even if Islamabad will not acknowledge this.
Britain''s Channel 4 showed an extraordinary documentary in 2009,
''Terror in Mumbai'', which contained footage of controllers sitting
in Pakistan and communicating with the terrorists in Mumbai on cell
phones." .
Future unrosy
Was Partition always going to be violent?
Jan 20th 2011
| from PRINT EDITION
The Economist
Tinderbox: The Past and Future of Pakistan. By M.J. Akbar.
HarperCollins India; 343 pages; 499 rupees
WHEN India and Pakistan began, in 1947, they shared many of the same
peoples and a legal and administrative history going back five
centuries. What explains their subsequent divergence, with India now
broadly stable and prosperous and Pakistan crisis-ridden? According to
M.J. Akbar, an erudite Indian journalist who is a Muslim, “The idea of
India is stronger than the Indian; the idea of Pakistan is weaker than
the Pakistani.”
India was founded as a secular democracy. Given its great diversity,
it is hard to think how it could have been otherwise. Pakistan was
created to be a homeland for India’s Muslims, an idea that was weak on
two counts. First, because it implied a threat to Muslims, or Islam,
in Hindu- majority India that in retrospect appears bogus. India’s
160m Muslims are free and no worse off than Pakistan’s 180m. Second,
the Islamic rationale for Pakistan contained an ambiguity about the
role of Islam in the new state, which has given rise to extremism. As
Mr Akbar writes, “the germ of theocracy lay in Pakistan’s genes.”
No one would have been more appalled by this than Pakistan’s founder,
Muhammad Ali Jinnah. A whisky-drinking anglophile, he envisaged
Pakistan as an India-style democracy. Yet he also helped begin its
descent by playing upon chauvinist Muslim fears for political gain. A
stalwart of the independence movement, he had been a late convert to
the cause of Pakistan, swayed to it only after the early collaboration
between Hindu and Muslim freedom-fighters had broken down.
There were many reasons for this. Indian Muslims had a history of
violent opposition to the British that was at odds with Gandhi’s
non-violence. Their elite felt superior to Hindus—a hangover from the
Mughal empire—and feared losing their residual privileges under Hindu
rule. The leaders of the Congress party, including Jawaharlal Nehru,
were insensitive to these fears. It also suited India’s British rulers
to worsen the schism. Had any of these parties acted differently, the
calamity of partition, in which perhaps a million perished, might
perhaps have been avoided.
Among many recent books on Pakistan, Mr Akbar’s stands out. Above all,
it is a fine and detailed history of Indian Muslim anger and
insecurity, spawned by the 18th-century decline of the Mughals, and
the way this played out in the freedom struggle. It is a lively read;
Mr Akbar is a stylish writer with an excellent eye for a gag. Of the
Mughal emperor Babur, he writes, he “was equally adept at writing
poetry, art criticism, military strategy and piling rebel skulls in
the shape of a pyramid.”
The book’s final chapters, on Pakistan’s recent struggle with
militancy and extremism, are less good. That may have to do with Mr
Akbar’s nationality. Denied much access to Pakistan, Indian analysts
sometimes struggle to keep abreast of it. But that Mr Akbar is Indian,
let it be said, is largely immaterial: his book is fair and balanced.
So, too, were his opening remarks at its launch, attended by an array
of Indian leaders. “If Salmaan Taseer had been an Indian Muslim, he
would be alive today,” he said, referring to the Pakistani governor of
Punjab, murdered by a fanatic this month. That was provocative; also
true.
'Tinderbox..' MJ
Akbar's views on Pakistan
Zafri Mudasser Nofil
Press Trust Of India
New Delhi: Pakistan may have little hope for peace with India but a
settlement with New Delhi will help remove the jihad culture ravaging
the country, writes veteran journalist MJ Akbar in his new book.
In 'Tinderbox: The Past and Future of Pakistan', published by Harper
Collins India, Akbar embarks on a historical whodunit to trace the
journey of an idea, and the events, people, circumstances and mind set
that divided India.
The investigation spans a thousand years, and an extraordinary cast:
visionaries, opportunists, statesmen, tyrants, plunderers, generals,
and an unusual collection of theologians, beginning with Shah
Waliullah who created a 'theory of distance' to protect 'Islamic
identity' from Hindus and Hinduism.
"There might be little hope for peace with India, given the
fundamental divergence on Kashmir, but a settlement with India will
help excise the jihad culture ravaging Pakistan," says Akbar.
According to the writer, it is comparatively easier for India to come
to terms with Pakistan.
"Economic growth and dreams of becoming a part of the first world have
begun to dominate the Indian mind. The Indian middle class has begun
to appreciate a simple reality: social violence and economic growth
cannot coexist. Liberalization has had an impact on lifestyle and
attitudes.
"The culture of consumerism has been quickly adopted by the young,
while entertainment television is a mirror of sexual liberation and
the fusion of Western mores with Indian sentiment."
He says that the most remarkable aspect of this change was that "even
terrorism, often exported from Pakistan, and wearing an 'Islamic'
label, did not feed a backlash in the form of Hindu-Muslim riots, even
after the venomous terrorise attacks in Mumbai in 2008."
Akbar feels India is content being a status quo-ist power, determined
to preserve its current geography, without serious claims even on
territory it believes it has lost to China along the Himalayas and to
Pakistan in Kashmir.
"Peace is a logical extension of this position. There is a large and
growing constituency in Pakistan that understands this. But unless
Pakistan achieves clarity on terrorism, with all its snake-oil
justifications, the subcontinent will remain hostage to malevolent
mania," he writes.
The book also talks about LeT's involvement in the 26/11 attacks.
LeT's involvement with the terrorist strike on Mumbai is well known,
even if Islamabad will not acknowledge this. Britain's Channel 4
showed an extraordinary documentary in 2009, 'Terror in Mumbai', which
contained footage of controllers sitting in Pakistan and communicating
with the terrorists in Mumbai on cell phones."
Akbar also mentions how
Pakistan President Asif Ali Zardari admitted before a closed-door
meeting of officials on the evening of 7 July 2009, that conflict with
India had bred a nexus between terrorist groups and Pakistan's
intelligence agencies.
"Militants and extremists emerged on the national scene and challenged
the state not because the civil bureaucracy was weakened and
demoralized but because they were deliberately created and nurtured as
a policy to achieve short-term tactical objectives.
Let's be truthful and make a candid admission of the reality. The
terrorists of today were heroes of yesteryear until 9/11 occurred and
they began to haunt us as well," Zardari had said.
Akbar also recalls how Maulana Azad made some significant predictions
about Pakistan in interviews to Shorish Kashmiri, editor of a Lahore
magazine Chattan, 1946.
"The moment the creative warmth of Pakistan cools down, the
contradictions will emerge and will acquire assertive overtones. These
will be fuelled by the clash of interests of international powers and
consequently both wings will separate...
"After the separation of East Pakistan, whenever it happens, West
Pakistan will become the battleground of regional contradictions and
disputes," Azad had said.
Azad had warned that the "evil consequences of Partition" will not
affect India alone.
"Pakistan will be equally haunted by them... We must remember that an
entity conceived in hatred shall last only as long as that hatred
lasts. This hatred shall overwhelm relations between India and
Pakistan. In this situation it will not be possible for India and
Pakistan to become friends and live amicably unless some catastrophic
event takes place."
Vice President
Releases The Book “Tinderbox: The Past and Future of Pakistan”
Press Information Bureau
(11 January 2011)
The Vice President of India Shri M. Hamid Ansari released a book
entitled
“Tinderbox: The Past and Future of Pakistan” written by Shri M.J.
Akbar at a
function here today. Addressing on the occasion he has said that the
book dilates
on a concept. As with other ideas, their interpretation and
actualisation is time and
space specific. Some in Pakistan seeking empowerment and
legitimisation read into
it a political agenda and a military strategy. A great many scholars
and
practitioners of Islam the world over would interpret and practice it
differently. Nor
should it be forgotten that in the eighties of the last century, the
term was lauded
and lionised in many of the chancelleries of the world!
The Vice President has said that one aspect of the past needs a
corrective. It is
purveyed that the Muslims of British India opted for a separate
homeland in 1947.
Who and how many exercised the option? It is forgotten that universal
adult
suffrage did not exist prior to 1950. Voting rights were based on
property, taxes,
service in the military forces and literacy and were enjoyed by about
11 percent of
the population. Commenting on the election of 1946, the historian
Ayesha Jalal has
observed that in the Punjab, only a third of the total votes was cast.
Following is the text of the Vice President’s address :
“This book is vintage MJ. Incisive analysis, brilliant passages, wide
sweep, bold
judgements. One could agree or disagree, but read one must. I was
intrigued by
the title and had to look up the dictionary meaning of the term
Tinderbox. It is
defined as a small container holding flint, firesteel and tinder, used
together to help
kindle a fire. I assume the author intends to depict a flammable or an
explosive mix.
Also intriguing is the subtitle: The Past and the Future of Pakistan.
Both themes
are valid and worthy of discourse. Ventures in futurology, however,
would be more
productive if they analyse the present more thoroughly in all its
ingredients. This
would necessitate closer scrutiny of the ethnic, regional and
sociological aspects
to comprehend the volatility that characterises the scene. No less
relevant are the
direct and indirect consequences of the involvement of the state, and
segments of
society, in quest of regional strategic objectives.
The book dilates on a concept. As with other ideas, their
interpretation and
actualisation is time and space specific. Some in Pakistan seeking
empowerment
and legitimisation read into it a political agenda and a military
strategy. A great
many scholars and practitioners of Islam the world over would
interpret and
practice it differently. Nor should it be forgotten that in the
eighties of the last
century, the term was lauded and lionised in many of the chancelleries
of the
world!
One aspect of the past needs a corrective. It is purveyed that the
Muslims of
British India opted for a separate homeland in 1947. Who and how many
exercised
the option? It is forgotten that universal adult suffrage did not
exist prior to 1950.
Voting rights were based on property, taxes, service in the military
forces and
literacy and were enjoyed by about 11 percent of the population.
Commenting on
the election of 1946, the historian Ayesha Jalal has observed that in
the Punjab,
only a third of the total votes was cast.
In retrospect, it is evident that partition was the result of a
political adjustment at
the elite level, rather than of a mass desire to separate. It did
enormous harm.
Choudhry Khaliquzzaman, wiser after the event, observed that the two
nation
theory ‘never paid any dividends to us and proved positively injurious
to the
Muslims of India, and on a longer term basis for Muslims everywhere’.
Maulana Azad’s assessment, and prognosis, cited by Mr. Akbar in the
concluding
pages of the book, does remain the last word.
And yet, one cannot confine oneself to a diet of mishaps of the past,
or even an
unhealthy one of the present. The pasture of stupidity, said Ibn
Khaldun, is
unwholesome to mankind. Wisdom and practical common sense would
necessitate
course correctives in Pakistan and the people there would find their
way of doing
it. We, as immediate neighbours, have a vested interest in the
stability and well
being of Pakistan and its people.”
Sources:
Press Information Bureau
(11 January 2011)
|
|
"Fratelli di Sangue"
Italian Translated version
of Blood Brothers |
Fratelli di Sangue
Published by Neri Pozza
The Launch event was attended by M J Akbar, (the
author), the chairman of the Group-Gmc Adnkronos Knights
of Labour and Joseph Marra, and the Deputy chairman Of
the Italy-India Sandro Gozi, the president of 'Ducati
Energy' Guidalberto Guidi, the chairman of Piaggio Group
Roberto Colaninno and The entrepreneur Maurizio Romiti. |
|
Fratelli di Sangue
Published by Neri Pozza
SBN 978-88-545-0186-7
Pagine 352 Pages 352
Euro 18,50 Euro 18.50
Collana: Le tavole d'oro Series: The tables gold |
|
Blood Brothers
|

Blood Brothers by M J Akbar
(Last Published 2006)
Blood Brothers
|
MJ Books & BB Reviews
Prayaag
My grandfather died while I was playing on his chest, that was
my first stroke of luck. My elder aunt, dark, wise, hunched
against her corner of the courtyard, promptly declared that his
soul, seething with miracles, had passed into me.
- READ
EXCERPTS & INTERVIEWS |
|
|
|
Have
you read MJ Books?
Any other Book?
Send
your reviews (Without attachments) to:
mjakbar@mjakbar.org |
 |
|
M J Akbar's Book on
Pakistan Launched
By Neha Tara Mehta
"The Partition did Indian Muslims, and Muslims everywhere
"enormous harm", Vice- President Hamid Ansari said in the
Capital on Tuesday, even as he reiterated that India has vested
interest in the stability of Pakistan and its people.
In a rare admission by a constitutional figure on the
cataclysmic watershed of the country's history, Ansari described
Partition as "the result of a political adjustment at the elite
level, rather than of a mass desire to separate." He was
launching India Today and Headlines Today editorial director M.
J. Akbar's eighth book, Tinderbox: The Past and Future of
Pakistan (HarperCollins India).
Quoting M. A. Jinnah's supporter and Muslim League leader
Choudhry Khaliquzzaman, Ansari said: "(He) observed that the two
nation theory never paid any dividends to us and proved
positively injurious to the Muslims of India, and on a longer
term basis for Muslims everywhere." He was addressing a star-
studded audience comprising leaders across the political
spectrum, from finance minister Pranab Mukherjee to National
Democratic Alliance chairman L. K. Advani, Leader of the
Opposition in the Rajya Sabha Arun Jaitley, civil aviation
minister Praful Patel, BJP notables Yashwant Sinha, Jaswant
Singh, Ravi Shankar Prasad and Shatrughan Sinha, and Congress
Rajya Sabha MP Mani Shankar Aiyar.
The evening, however, was dominated by the politics of Pakistan,
or what Akbar describes in his book as the "jelly state" that
can neither "achieve stability, nor disintegrate." Pointing to
the recent assassination of Pakistan's Punjab governor Salman
Taseer, National Democratic Alliance chairman L. K. Advani said:
"More disturbing than the killing was the fact that no cleric
wanted to come forward and perform his last rites." He was
referring to Akbar's comment that "if Salman Taseer had been an
Indian Muslim, he would still have been alive." Advani, as was
expected, could not help referring to his "experience" when he
had referred to "Jinnah as a person who basically wanted a
secular state with a Muslim majority." His remark drew knowing
laughter from the audience.
Mukherjee, who has also served as the external affairs minister,
said: "We cannot wish away our neighbour. We have a vested
interest in the stability and wellbeing of Pakistan because we
cannot develop in isolation but together." Of course, he was
quick to add that his office imposed "natural restraints" on him
to proceed further on the subject.
Opening the discussion, Akbar (it was also his 60th birthday)
said the difference between the two neighbours was that the idea
of India is stronger than the Indian, and the idea of Pakistan
is weaker than the Pakistani.
"Pakistan is an idea that is regressive, India is an idea that
is progressive," Akbar said, reminding the audience of Maulana
Abul Kalam Azad's prediction that Pakistan would eventually
become "the playground of foreign powers." He added that
Pakistan's civil society should relocate to Delhi because there
won't be space for "brilliant book on India's Siamese twin with
a faulty valve", Rajya Sabha MP (and one- time high commissioner
to Pakistan) Mani Shankar Aiyar said: "The difference between
Akbar and me is that he sees Pakistan as a 'tinderbox'. I see it
as a ' tenderbox'." Jaitley, who was queuing up to buy the book,
said: "I am interested in MJ's analysis of how he perceives the
state to be, particularly how he perceives its future." His
party colleague, Yashwant Sinha, who was in Karachi on the day
Salman Taseer was assassinated in Lahore, added: "The past is
well known. But I want to find out how MJ sees the future of
Pakistan and South Asia." it in the neighbouring country for
long.
Earlier, introducing the book, India Today Group chairman and
editor-in-chief Aroon Purie recalled what a friend from Pakistan
had said to him. "You don't understand we are like your younger
brother," the friend had said: "who is an alcoholic, drug addict
and goon. You can't throw us out, so help us to change." Purie,
who's also HarperCollins India director, said: "Pakistan has
been called many things - failed state, frontier state, Islamic
state but I think from now on the definition that is going to
stick is the one contained in MJ's book. He describes it as a '
jelly state'." He added that Taseer's assassination was "the
latest reminder of the timeliness of this book". On a lighter
note, Purie said: "I am much older than MJ but he's lost more
hair than I have. And I have a theory of why this has happened.
That head of his is full of knowledge of an incredible range of
subjects - philosophy, religion, mythology, politics and of
course, history not only of India but of the world. ... So I
guess the hair could not take the heat generated by all this
information which just keeps on accumulating." The book,
predictably, evoked much discussion on the sidelines.
Sources:
India Today
(12 January 2011) |
|
Pakistan’s
problems are in Pakistan’s DNA |
An interview
with MJ Akbar – by Rahul Pandita
Veteran journalist MJ Akbar’s latest book is Tinderbox: The Past
and Future of Pakistan, a title rendered even more relevant by
the recent assassination of Salman Taseer, governor of the
province of Punjab in Pakistan. The man, Akbar tells Open, would
likely have been alive had he been an Indian Muslim. An
interview:
Q Yours is a book about Pakistan, but it
is perhaps inevitable that the dice of its formative history is
cast in India. How come the two nations stand so apart today?
A One of the points made in the book is that Indians and
Pakistanis are the same people. Why have the two countries moved
on two different trajectories? It is because the idea of India
is stronger than the Indian and the idea of Pakistan is weaker
than the Pakistani. For all its weaknesses, for all its
contradictions, the idea of India is essentially a modern idea.
For me, modernity requires four non-negotiables. One, [the
country] must be a democracy, and not an arbitrary democracy.
Two, there must be secularism, and that does not mean the
separation of Church and State, really—what it means is giving
every faith the right to practise. Three, you cannot have
modernity without gender equality. And you can see where
Pakistan slips on these. Four, you must have economic equity.
Not economic equality because that is not possible, but economic
equity, and that is where we fail. As long as there are
Naxalites, we cannot call ourselves a modern state. But Pakistan
is becoming regressive. We are at least a progressive idea.
Q You have said that it is easier for
India to come to terms with Pakistan, than vice-versa. Why do
you say that?
A You see, Pakistan is built on a two-nation theory. That says
that you, Rahul, and I, MJ Akbar cannot be in the same room
without declaring war against each other. It is a stupid idea,
particularly in the context of people who have lived together
for a thousand years. You have to be spectacularly stupid to
convert this idea into a nation. But when you want to justify
that idea all the time, you need the enmity of the Hindu. [In
contrast], India doesn’t need the enmity of the Muslim in order
to justify secularism. In fact, India needs to sell the fact
that Hindus and Muslims can live together. That is why India can
have a perfect ups-and-downs relationship with Bangladesh, with
Nepal, with Sri Lanka, but it is very difficult with Pakistan as
it is constantly reinventing the war of 1947. That is why when
you have a two-nation theory, Kashmir doesn’t remain a normal
boundary dispute, Kashmir becomes an ideological ‘jihad’ for the
‘liberation of Kashmiri Muslims from Hindu barbarity’. It is
really absurd.
Q You cite a meeting between senior
Pakistani officials and President Zardari where he admits that
the conflict with India has bred a nexus between terror groups
and Pakistan’s intelligence units…
A Pakistan’s problems are in Pakistan’s DNA. The moment you are
looking for purity and a pure theocratic state, then you get
your theocratic state, but what you don’t get is the definition
of purity. So, which Muslim is purer? “I am holier than thou!”
And therefore the Shia is impure, you have to destroy Shias, you
have to destroy Bengalis because each one does not fit into your
model. “And as the elite of Punjab or the Frontier, I decide
what is pure. And so these low-level Bengalis are not proper
Muslims!” You take Bangladesh. Bengali Muslims did not get their
land after a struggle with Hindus. They got it by a struggle
with fellow Muslims.
Q You also call projections of Pakistan’s
disintegration highly exaggerated. You instead call it a ‘jelly
state’, one that will neither stabilise nor disintegrate.
A Nation states don’t disappear once they are created. Because
institutions are built to at least defend their geographical
integrity. But it is probably more dangerous to be a jelly
state. And Pakistan has nuclear weapons.
Q Does the current scenario in Pakistan
hold any lesson for Kashmiris?
A Kashmiris have a choice whether they want to go with a modern
idea… there is a lot of emotionalism, of course, and there is a
history to it. But I tell you, go to Kashmir and ask a simple
question, particularly to the women: “Do you want a job in
Bangalore or in Peshawar?” And you’ll have the answer.
Q Let’s come to the assassination of
Salman Taseer. Nobody has said a word against it. Not even the
elite of Pakistan.
A It is not the reaction of the elite; it is the reaction of the
nation. Indira Gandhi died a victim to a theocratic bullet. Can
you imagine—a member of the minority has killed a Hindu Brahmin
Prime Minister! But the nation used that moment to check any
association with theocracy. Even right-wing Hindu parties. They
acted by going nationalist. That is where the DNA of India
lies—in a secular answer, instinctively. If Salman Taseer had
been an Indian Muslim, he might still be alive.
Q You say the Taliban have created class
divisions by exploiting the poor in Pakistan. Naxals, many say,
have done the same in India. So, is a big middle class really a
boon?
A The reaction of the middle class to the Salman Taseer case on
the issue of blasphemy is more dangerous than the reaction of
the poor. The lawyers in Pakistan are the middle class. So I am
not sure whether the middle class is always a blessing. It’s a
blessing for us who run magazines.
Q What is the pragmatic best we can hope
for when it comes to Indo-Pak relations?
A I see very little hope because Pakistan will not and cannot
abandon its two-nation theory. But really, in their thinking and
policy, they must abandon the two-nation theory. They must now
move away from it because it really sullies the mood of the
whole Subcontinent. I think the future of Pakistan lies in the
man who created the two-nation theory [Jinnah]. He walked away
the moment he created it. There was nothing that Jinnah said in
his speech on 11-12 August 1947 at the Karachi constituent
assembly which he could not have said in India’s Parliament.
Jinnah himself could have been a very proud member of Indian
Parliament by temperament. He was a secular man. But he didn’t
realise what he had created. If Pakistan has to survive as a
rational nation, then it must really become Jinnah’s Pakistan
rather than [founder of the Jamaat-e-Islami] Maududi’s Pakistan. |
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Honest to
yourself: MJ on questions of Identity |
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An Interview with
Vikhar Ahmed Sayeed
M. J. Akbar's
engaging book, “Tinderbox: The Past and Future of Pakistan”, has
raced to the bestseller list within a few weeks of its launch.
This is not a surprise as Akbar's great strength as a popular
author lies in his rigour as a scholar and his felicity as a
writer. Evident since his first book, “India: A Siege Within”,
and all through his career as a journalist and editor, his
riveting prose and epigrammatic style have ensured that his
works are widely read even if much has been written on the theme
already. In “Tinderbox” Akbar argues that the formation of
Pakistan was the “culmination of a search for what might be
called ‘Muslim space' that began during the decline of the
Mughal Empire, by a north Indian elite “driven by fear of the
future and pride in the past”. His rhetoric is powerful and his
language eloquent as he ventures ahead with this thesis, which
is novel in some ways, as it differs from the major historical
narratives of the formation of Pakistan.
For Akbar, the seminal date was 1739 when Nadir Shah massacred
the population of Delhi and looted it. This, for him, marks the
beginning of a search for Muslim political space.
“I make the point very strongly that when the community was
deprived of all the structures of power it is only the ulema
that stood by it,” he says on being asked whether he thinks the
Muslim theologians were part of the Muslim elite.
“I'm really not here to defend any version. I'm here to define
what I think is right. I don't believe in Right and Left
versions. That's nonsense. This kind of thinking is weak and
tepid and is utterly irrational,” Akbar responds on being asked
whether his book is endorsing a partisan version of history.
In the gazebo restaurant at the ITC Royal Gardenia, where we sit
and chat, he laughs loudly and waves to acquaintances. Our
discussion plonks along on the little islands inhabited by his
current work but I'm easily distracted by larger questions of
identity, of India and Pakistan, and of writing. And he answers
all of them in short staccato bursts as our time was running
out.
On his identity and whether this affects his work he says: “I'm
an Indian and I am a Muslim and I'm extremely proud of both
identities. How can we distinguish ourselves from our outer
selves? But whatever we do, we have to be honest to ourselves.”
On India and Pakistan: “The idea of India is stronger than the
Indian, and the idea of Pakistan has proved weaker than the
Pakistani.” On writing: “Writing is a means of communication. If
you haven't reached the other, then your purpose is not
achieved.”
When asked what he thought about Mani Shankar Aiyar's
provocative review of his book a mischievous smile with a hint
of sarcasm dallied briefly on his lips while he replied: “Mani
is a friend of mine and just as I have a viewpoint, he has a
viewpoint. We still meet each other, enjoy each other's company
but you mustn't think with your heart.”
In his career as a journalist and writer, which Akbar began in
1971, he has been associated with nine separate media
organisations (many of which he started) and written seven
books.
An interlude as a Member of Parliament also adds some richness
to his CV. Is he restless? “No. I believe I have only one life
and I maximise the opportunities. In Delhi, it is even simpler;
you can either go to parties or write books.” |
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REVIEW LINKS |
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